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Governance in the Eurozone has recently been reinforced following two different 
but complementary strategies. On the one hand, the passing of several legal acts 
of secondary EU law (known as the Six Pack and the forthcoming Two Pack) has 
strengthened the existing, but perceived as insufficient, coordination of national 
economic policies. On the other hand, a piece of international law has been 
signed by all but two of the Member States (the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union) in order to install in their 
national legal orders the principles guiding European economic governance. This 
paper is particularly concerned with the legitimation mechanisms for these new 
arrangements. In previous research the author established a threefold scheme for 
studying different examples of governance in relation to democratic legitimacy. In 
particular, governance can be conceived (1) as fully respecting decisions adopted 
according to democratic legitimacy and emphasizing its efficient implementation; 
(2) as complementing democratic legitimacy, for instance by accepting or even 
integrating technical and expert advice in public decision-making; or (3) as an 
alternative to democratic legitimacy, as is the case when public decision-making 
relies on independent non-majoritarian agencies. The aim of this paper is to proceed 
with a democratic legitimacy assessment of recent developments in Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), in particular of the new governance mechanisms resulting 
from those two strategies. This task cannot be carried out without dealing with the 
underlying conceptions EMU is based on, and from which its particular features 
result. Hence, we will first describe and specify the theoretical models according 
to which the relationship between governance and democratic legitimacy can 
be assessed (I). In a second step, we will describe the main features of EMU as 
designed in Maastricht (II) and will compare that construction with the theoretical 
models (III). A description will follow of the development of governance in the 
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European Union and, in particular, of the new governance mechanisms recently 
designed for EMU (IV). Then, we will assess them against the yardstick of our 
theoretical models (V). Finally, we will conclude by summarizing the main findings 
of the survey (VI).
I. A conceptual framework for studying 
(economic) governance
The relationship between governance and democratic legitimacy depends on the 
particular manifestation of each concrete governance mechanism. Thus, there is 
not a clear, stable and permanent link between both theoretical concepts. Such a 
link may exclusively result from each concrete realization of governance theories. 
Departing from this basic assumption, we will articulate the disparate manifestations 
of governance into three narratives (ideal theoretical reconstructions) under a claim 
of internal consistency. In turn, these narratives will constitute the parameters 
against which specific examples of governance can be measured.
Governance mechanisms provide very different responses to some of the 
challenges Western democracies are currently facing. Among them we can mention 
how to address increasing social complexity, the decline of political representation 
because of the power of the media, the relevance of specialized and technical 
knowledge in the adoption of public decisions (which, in the terminology coined by 
García-Pelayo (1972), has led to a technological civilization), emphasis on results 
instead of on procedures (output versus input legitimacy) or the importance of the 
implementing stage in the political process. Elaboration of the theoretical models 
results from grouping the several responses to these challenges provided by the 
various governance mechanisms according to three coherent narratives.2
For the purposes of a paper revolving around the economic governance of 
EMU, it is important to mention, at least briefly, the challenge that the integration 
of scientific knowledge in political decision-making poses to representative 
democracies. This challenge, personified in the figure of technocrats, is twofold, 
since on one hand the compartmentalization of problems inherent to this type of 
knowledge prevents an adequate response to social complexity (problems may 
refer to a specific field, but they usually have an impact in related areas), while on 
the other hand the mere subordination of public authorities to updated technical 
knowledge removes, avoids, or at least challenges, any political responsibility for 
their decision.
Habermas has referred to this paradox. His argument could be summarized 
by saying that the greater the integration of scientific knowledge in public 
decision-making procedures, the less political responsibility for them (and vice 
2 For a more detailed explanation of how the models are elaborated, see Losada, forthcoming 
2013 (chapter 2). A different analytical approach to the relationship between governance practices 
and legitimacy in Bekkers and Edwards 2007, 35–60.
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versa). Depending on the relationship between experts on the subject matter 
and representatives of the political community, Habermas distinguishes three 
decision-making models. In the first of these, the decisionist model, the technique 
is considered an auxiliary element of political strategy, so that decisions are 
taken under convictions and not because of an uncontroversial technical reason 
(Habermas 1999, 132; García-Pelayo 1972, 69). The technocratic model, on the 
other hand, would lead to adoption of these decisions by experts and technicians, 
detaching decisions from any political agenda or world view and allowing them 
to achieve the consideration of absolute technical truths.3 Finally, the pragmatist 
model presupposes a dialogue between the expert and the politician, from which a 
political decision is expected to emerge according to the technical circumstances 
(Habermas 1999, 138; García-Pelayo 1972, 69–70).
Our three discourses or theoretical models establishing a relationship between 
democratic legitimacy and governance mechanisms are an elaborated construction 
that departs from this distinction (but not equivalent to it, as we will see). We can 
regard them as three specific and homogeneous views within a continuum. Thus, 
taking as a reference a line representing democratic legitimacy, we will depart from 
the end at which governance carefully respects it and just focuses on effective 
implementation of decisions adopted in accordance with it. We will later stop at 
a medium point, which corresponds to a narrative in which governance would 
be a complement to democratic legitimacy. Finally, we will reach the other end, 
where governance is conceived as an alternative to democratic legitimacy or as 
a reformulation of the parameter according to which legitimacy should be tested. 
Thus, our three theoretical constructs exhaust the space of the continuum in which 
we represent democratic legitimacy. 
A) Governance as effective implementation 
The first theoretical model articulating existing governance mechanisms that 
are unrelated to each other in a coherent discourse, conceives governance as a 
system fully respecting democratic legitimacy and seeking to improve efficacy at 
the stage in which decisions are implemented or enforced. The core idea of this 
first model, therefore, is to respect democratic legitimacy and to redefine the role of 
bureaucracy, replacing its traditional hierarchical character for a more flexible one, 
according to the approach of governance.
This new approach to bureaucracy carefully takes into account, at least as far 
as participation is concerned, the view of those affected by public decisions and, 
especially, of the key institutions responsible for implementing them. Therefore, 
3 Habermas 1999, 134; García-Pelayo 1972, 67; Bobbio (1987 [1984], 37) considers that 
technocracy and democracy are deeply antithetical, since “[t]he hypothesis which underlies 
democracy is that all are in a position to make decisions about everything. The technocracy claims, 
on the contrary, that the only ones called on to make decisions are the few who have the relevant 
expertise”.
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the main asset of this model is that individuals and groups affected by a norm 
as well as administrative bodies responsible for carrying out its implementation 
would be closely involved in decision-making procedures adapting the general rule 
to the context in which it must be applied. This participation would be aimed at 
transferring knowledge about the geographical, social or economic peculiarities 
for more effective implementation. For this reason, coordination between different 
levels of government during the whole implementing process is supposed to be 
very close.
Moreover, in this model technical decisions would be assigned to those 
administrative bodies expert on implementation. Indeed, the administration 
has a number of technicians integrated into the civil service who guarantee the 
best possible adaptation of a political decision to updated technical knowledge. 
Importantly in this respect, executive agencies are the preferred method for acting in 
specific technical areas (technocratic model) while benchmarking is favoured when 
dealing with more general areas in which the interaction between politicians and 
experts is higher (pragmatist model). Thus, a public authority delegates to experts 
a quota of its power of decision. However, in the eyes of the public, performance 
by the experts will be part of government action. Indeed, the responsibility for 
technical decision-making rests with the administrative body, which in turn reports 
to the government, allowing the political power always to have an input or even the 
last word on a technical decision.
With regard to the institutional arrangements that would result from this model, 
this new way of understanding bureaucracy would make administration highly 
flexible in order to adapt it to the wide range of contexts in which policy decisions 
are implemented. In addition, some permanent links would be established 
between representative bodies from all levels of government, perhaps somehow 
institutionalizing their participation, but always taking into account the identification 
of particularly affected bodies, which would be carefully addressed.
B) Governance as a complement to democratic legitimacy
A second way of conceiving governance would be as a reinforcement of 
democratic legitimacy. According to this theoretical model the effectiveness of 
public action needs to be increased. The key element here is that the improvement 
in effectiveness is subordinated to democratic legitimacy. Thus, this conception 
of governance would emphasize that public decisions should properly reflect the 
will of the political community. But this can no longer be adequately achieved 
just by resorting to representative institutions. Governance would, therefore, be a 
correction of this deficiency.
This eagerness to make public decisions accurately reflect the will of the 
political community means that when adopting them political bodies would devote 
special attention to participation by social actors, mainly through what is known as 
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organized civil society. Those interactions, nevertheless, may face some difficulties. 
First, because although it is true that organized civil society is an indirect means of 
expressing the will of the political community, it is also true that its most important 
stakeholders will be precisely the ones which will exercise the decisive influence 
when adopting the decision. By stakeholders we mean those social actors affected 
by the decision and those whose interests are involved in it. It should be noted, 
therefore, that these actors, be they companies, associations of people or private 
citizens affected, usually defend their particular interests,4 so that public authorities 
are ultimately those who will have to represent the common interest. A second 
problem with this type of interaction is to determine who is affected and who is not, 
since the final content of the decision may depend on who is entitled to participate 
in the decision-making process. A final problem concerns diffuse interests, 
represented by barely relevant actors and individuals, who rarely have access to 
decision making.
But the relevant point about these interactions is the impact they have on 
the structure of society. On the one hand, since interests are better defended 
collectively than individually, this kind of governance fosters the emergence of 
society-organizing networks of actors, thereby minimizing the chances of exclusion 
or marginalization of diffuse interests. Thus, by exchanging information and pooling 
resources, these networks help organized actors to influence the decision-making 
process by lobbying during the whole legislative process. Furthermore, it should 
be mentioned as an additional consequence that since those affected by public 
decisions will be different depending on the case, each decision would involve 
the participation of a particular sector of the political community. Consequently, 
we could therefore predict that the more powerful in society an actor is, the more 
it will participate in public decisions. As a result, its leading position in society will 
be strengthened and will make of it a factual power.5 The foundations of a post-
democratic society are thus reinforced by this discourse of governance.6
Moreover, since in this conception of governance the principle of efficiency is 
still subordinated to democratic legitimacy, we must assume that the institutional 
arrangements resulting from it would be similar to those currently existing. Traditional 
4 Non-governmental organizations are a special case, since theoretically they defend the general 
interest (notwithstanding the fact that they sometimes simply act in defence of their prerogatives and 
the rights acquired by reason of their political activity).
5 Far from being a mere theoretical concern, this seems to be the case. See for example how a 
network of major corporations successfully lobbied in order to include the most favourable version 
of impact assessment for them in European Treaties in Smith, Fooks, Collin, Weishaar, Mandal & 
Gilmore 2010, 1–17.
6 Colin Crouch not only coined the term but has also used it for revealing some hidden features of 
the concrete realization of the democratic ideal in our times: “My central contentions are that, while 
the forms of democracy remain fully in place – and today in some respects are actually strengthened 
– politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the 
manner characteristic of pre-democratic times; and that one major consequence of this process is 
the growing impotence of egalitarian causes”, Crouch 2004, 6. Crouch has refined his ideas on post-
democracy in Crouch 2011, in which he explores the role corporations play in our society after the 
economic crisis.
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bodies of popular representation (parliaments) and heads of bureaucracy or of 
executive power (governments) would not lose their current main features and 
would continue to be the centre of political activity. The only new item this type 
of governance would imply for the institutional system will be the channelling of 
participation through consultation processes with stakeholders. This will enhance 
the deliberative nature of democracy.
Especially important is participation in the legislative process of all the 
different levels of government. Since they are representative bodies, this way 
of understanding governance would privilege their participation in the political 
process. However, in certain matters the interests of some lower representative 
bodies will be opposed. This means that in these cases their participation will follow 
the path of negotiations, in which each actor tries to get the maximum benefit to the 
detriment of the interests of other actors (zero-sum game).
As for technical decisions, since democratic legitimacy still prevails over the 
claim of effectiveness, representatives of the political community will adopt them. 
This does not prevent representatives from being advised on the matter by technical 
experts, whose arguments can indeed influence their decisions, but the final word 
and, therefore, responsibility for the decision, will lie with representatives of the 
public interest. The integration of specialized knowledge in public decision-making 
procedures is thus guided by the decisionist and pragmatist models, but citizens 
will at the end of the legislature’s term of power assess the whole set of public 
decisions. Therefore, the democratic principle is still observed.
C) Governance as an alternative to democratic legitimacy
The ideal narrative or theoretical model according to which governance would 
constitute an alternative discourse to democratic legitimacy7 is determined by two 
trends. First, the complexity and the constantly changing environment in which 
decisions are enforced, along with the popular demand for results for social 
problems, explain a concern about the effectiveness of political action rather than 
about democratic legitimacy. Secondly, the progress of technological civilization 
allows specialized and scientific knowledge to become involved in the decision-
making process. The combination of these two trends (outcome legitimacy and 
technocracy) constitutes the foundation of our third theoretical model of governance. 
As a reply to some legitimacy concerns arising in Western democracies during the 
last third of the past century (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975), it emphasizes 
the weak points of the authority-based hierarchical organization of bureaucracy 
7 In fact, this in principle just theoretical possibility has already been detected in Western 
democracies: “Where the rich democracies were once diagnosed as suffering a crisis of governability 
(…), today they are more likely to be diagnosed as suffering a deficit of democracy. More exactly, 
there is fear of parallel government, imperium in imperio: new structures of public action, outside 
the old ones, whose efficacy undermines the legitimacy of traditional democracy without offering an 
equivalent form of accountability of its own”, Sabel 2001, 122. 
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and its use of classic constitutional and administrative law, and proposes to obviate 
the traditional decision-making processes.
The basic assumption of this theoretical model of governance, seeking an 
improvement in the effectiveness of political action, is that public decision-making 
should be attached to specialized and non-representative bodies or be subject to 
special procedures not based on democratic legitimacy. Therefore, specialists, as 
holders of scientific knowledge, would be in charge of deciding on public issues. 
The political power, as less competent than experts (or even not competent at all), 
is not to interfere in issues considered technical and should renounce a say on 
such matters, whereas experts are on institutional authority to do so. Thus, this 
governance narrative constitutes the highest expression of the technocratic model 
of decision-making. In this regard it is also worth noting the low profile of the role to 
be played not only by representatives of the political community in general, but also 
by other actors who by virtue of their democratic legitimacy would enjoy a special 
share in the decision-making process, such as representatives of lower (regional 
or local) bodies.
The aim of increasing the effectiveness of public action would even lead to 
assuming lack of direct responsibility over decisions, breaking what for certain 
conceptions of democracy is one of its key principles. However, we must remember 
that what this model proposes is precisely an alternative institutional realization of 
democracy which legitimizes resort to decision-making methods other than those 
used when legitimacy is derived from representative democracy. Therefore, the 
blurring of direct responsibilities does not break the consistency of the theoretical 
model. In fact, there are different conceptions of democracy, some of them admitting 
that diffusion of power and institutionalization of a system of checks and balances 
to prevent the dictatorship of the majority can be understood as a legitimate and 
democratic form of domination.8
As to the institutional system that this type of governance would entail, the 
need to adapt to social circumstances or to those arising from continuous technical 
progress allows us to assume that institutional arrangements for this type of 
governance would be highly flexible, if they have not been created ad hoc. Since 
their decisions are primarily technical, decision-makers on a particular matter could 
always be the same (the most renowned experts in the field, for example), but due 
to progress in scientific knowledge we would assume that these players will take 
turns from time to time.
Finally, referring to the instruments and practices this vision of governance 
would resort to, it seems feasible that among them would be regulatory agencies, 
responsible for development of technical standards that affect a particular sector, 
as well as self-regulation practices, by which sectoral actors themselves agree and 
8 On this see Madison 2003 [1780]. Yet, this realization of the democratic principle, like all 
others, is not without its problems: “By separating power among President, House, and Senate, 
the Madisonian pattern not only generates a host of lawmaking pathologies, but also disrupts the 
coherence of professional public administration”, Ackerman 2000, 725. 
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adopt regulations affecting them. In this sense a widely established example in 
our democratic systems is the so called social dialogue between social partners, 
who are able to adopt sectoral implementing norms, as collective agreements are, 
without being backed by democratic legitimacy.
D) Some considerations on the models
As a culmination to this theoretical construct of the three ideal narratives according 
to which the different manifestations of governance can be consistently re-
conceived, the possible relationships between these models will be briefly outlined. 
The first consideration in this regard is that the models which conceive governance 
as effective implementation and as a complement to democratic legitimacy are not 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, the two respect democratic legitimacy, but at different 
stages of the regulatory process: one aims at strengthening it at the time when 
decisions are adopted and the other when they are implemented. For this reason 
the measures they both propose can be considered compatible. However, although 
both models aim at reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of public decisions 
involving other actors in their adoption or implementation, their approaches are 
different. While one emphasizes participation by social actors in order to reflect as 
closely as possible the popular will when taking decisions, the other, still counting 
on those social actors, primarily fosters contact with institutional stakeholders 
at local and regional levels as acquainted with the environment in which public 
decisions are to be applied.
Regarding the relation between the model which conceives governance as 
an alternative to democratic legitimacy and the other two, their incompatibility is 
obvious since the assumptions they depart from (observance or not of democratic 
legitimacy) are radically opposed. Thus, the models that are configured as an 
alternative and as complement to democratic legitimacy cannot coexist because 
they are based on assumptions that are mutually exclusive at a particular procedural 
stage of the regulatory process: adoption of decisions. One might think that, since 
they refer to different procedural moments, the situation would be different when 
we relate the model conceiving of governance as an alternative to democratic 
legitimacy and the model calling for effective implementation of democratically 
legitimated decisions, but the assumption that makes either speech coherent (their 
relationship to democratic legitimacy) prevents the compatibility of both narratives.
II. The original design of Economic and 
Monetary Union in Maastricht
It is well-known that the design of EMU rules in the Treaty of Maastricht was based 
on a split of monetary and economic policies. This was the result of the compromise 
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achieved by the Delors Committee in charge of the EMU negotiations.9 Making 
a caricature of this compromise, we might say that Germany only agreed to the 
French claim to establish a common currency (thus renouncing the Deutschmark, 
symbol of its economic prosperity after the Second World War) on the condition of 
replicating at the supranational level the main institutional design of the successful 
German economic setting.10 This institutional design was mainly based on Central 
Bank independence, as a way to guarantee price stability and to avoid time-
inconsistent policies leading to inflationist experiences of fateful memory.11 At the 
same time, a common economic government was rejected, economic policies 
being still in the competence of Member States. 
The result was the twofold conception mentioned. Monetary issues were 
conceived as a common policy, carried out within a new institutional setting: the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) with the European Central Bank (ECB) 
at its head. Its main feature, as agreed in the negotiations, was its institutional 
independence. Economic policies, on the other hand, were still in the competence 
of national governments, but a new procedure was established allowing for their 
necessary coordination. In this case no new institutional setting was created. 
Instead, Member States relied on existing institutions. However, it must be noted 
that, as to coordination of economic policies, European institutions were given 
different tasks than those which they were carrying out in other areas of EU law. 
This represented a move from the community method to what can be considered a 
direct precedent of the open method of coordination.
A) Main features of the common monetary policy 
EMU was designed as a political process in different and successive stages. For 
those Member States participating in the third (and final) stage of EMU or, putting 
it differently, for those Member States whose currency is the euro, all competences 
related to monetary policy, including fixing the exchange rate, have been conferred 
on the European Union (Article 3.1.c TFEU). Hence, they are exclusive competences 
at the supranational level. In addition, and as mentioned above, a new institutional 
setting (the ESCB and ECB) was established solely for dealing with these new 
exclusive competences. Thus it is important to bear in mind that competence over 
monetary issues and the institutional setting for dealing with them are indissolubly 
bound. The ESCB and ECB exist in order to fulfil the task assigned to them by 
9 On the EMU negotiations see Dyson and Featherstone 1999.
10 “In the light of the success of the Bundesbank, it is only natural that the German public will 
expect that any successor, which could take its place at the European level, should be at least as 
well equipped as the Bundesbank to defend price stability”, Tietmeyer 1991.
11 However, notice that this was not the original purpose, but the result of the Bundesbank’s 
institutional design. On this see Bibow 2004, 2–13.
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the Treaties, and that task (monetary policy) can only be carried out by these 
institutions. Substance and form are inextricably linked in this concrete policy.
This is reflected in the aims of both the policy and its institutional setting. 
Substantively, the primary objective of the single monetary policy is to “maintain price 
stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic 
policies in the Union” (Article 119.2 TFEU). Regarding the institutional setting, the 
main objective of the ESCB is to “maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in 
the Union” (Article 127.1 TFEU). Underlying this almost identical drafting are two 
parallel ideas: policy has to be driven towards price stability, and the institution in 
charge of conducting policy has to lead towards the very same aim. But they also 
mean that if new actors were assigned a role in policy, price stability will still be 
the aim to be achieved. The same can be said if new competences were conferred 
on the ESCB, since price stability will still be the main aim of its activity. This is of 
significant importance, as we will see.
The link between form and substance is also evident when considering how the 
ESCB is supposed to carry out its task of maintaining price stability. Independence of 
the authority in charge of monetary policy from political institutions is the cornerstone 
of the system. Avoiding all political interference when conducting monetary policy 
will increase the chances of meeting the aim of price stability. Therefore, members 
of the ESCB and ECB are forbidden to seek or take instructions from any European 
institution or any government of a Member State, and in turn the latter agree to 
respect the independent status of the ESCB and ECB (Article 130 TFEU). As a 
matter of fact, Member States have to guarantee the independent status of their 
own Central Banks in their national legislation, so as to avoid all possible influence 
on them (Article 131 TFEU).
B) Main features of the coordination of (national) economic policies
Establishing a common monetary policy not paralleled by a common economic 
government requires coordination of national economies in order to reduce 
disparities between them. Otherwise Member States could take advantage of 
the shared context by transferring the costs of their national policies to the other 
Member States. But mere coordination is not enough to guarantee EMU stability: 
limitation of national economic policies is also required. This is the reason why 
the common currency is accompanied by some restrictions of national economic 
policies, specifically concerning budgetary deficit and public debt. 
As to coordination of national economic policies, the main instrument at the 
disposal of European institutions for carrying it out are the broad economic policy 
guidelines for the European Union and its Member States (Article 121.2 TFEU). 
The Council adopts a recommendation with these guidelines after a proposal by 
the Commission and political agreement by the European Council. The European 
Dictatorship of Failure
36
Parliament only has to be informed once a recommendation has been adopted. 
Thus in procedural terms coordination is of a clear political nature, with national 
executives (either in the formation of the Council or at the European Council) having 
full responsibility over the content of the guidelines. The same conclusion can be 
achieved when considering the legal act adopting the guidelines, since the Treaties 
describe recommendations as having “no binding force” (Article 288 TFEU).
Coordination of national economic policies is monitored through a multilateral 
surveillance procedure (Article 121.3 and 121.4 TFEU).12 The Council is responsible 
for checking that Member States’ performance adjusts to the requirements of the 
overall strategy for the Union described in the guidelines. To that end, Member 
States keep the Commission informed about all economic measures they adopt, and 
it prepares a report for the Council. If Member States’ measures are not consistent 
with the guidelines or some economic developments may jeopardize the Union’s 
objectives, the Commission can issue a warning to the Member State(s) concerned. 
In a further step, the Council may finally adopt a recommendation to that end and, 
if necessary, even make it public. As is obvious from this description, multilateral 
surveillance is also of a mainly political nature, since no legal sanction exists for 
conducting economic policy beyond the margins established in the guidelines. As 
it was designed, the system bases Member State compliance in their commitment 
to policy objectives and, if necessary, in the political peer pressure exerted at the 
Council. Once again, there is not more than an obligation to report to the European 
Parliament about all events related to multilateral surveillance (Article 121.5 TFEU). 
All these elements show that according to the basic design of EMU, economic 
policies remain a national competence.
This basic principle notwithstanding, EMU imposes some restrictions over 
national economic policies. The whole system is based on the concept of economic 
stability. Accordingly, “Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits” 
(Article 126.1 TFEU). The importance of sound public finances is expressed in 
limitations to Member State budgetary deficits, which cannot exceed 3% of GDP, 
and public debt, which cannot go beyond 60% of GDP (Article 126.2 TFEU in 
relation to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 TEU on the excessive deficit procedure).13 
A somewhat tighter monitoring system than the one for coordination of economic 
policies is established for ensuring observance of these requirements: an excessive 
deficit procedure is launched by the Commission if a Member State breaches them 
or is perceived by the Commission to be at risk of doing so, although it is for the 
Council to finally decide about the existence of an excessive deficit. In such a 
case, it must adopt a recommendation addressed to the Member State concerned 
12 The procedure was further developed by Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97, of 7 July 1997, on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, 1).
13 Rules laid down in Article 126 TFEU were defined more precisely and strengthened by the 
Stability and Growth Pact, constituted, in particular, by the Resolution of the European Council of 17 
June 1997 (OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, 1) and Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, 6).
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establishing some time limit for putting an end to the situation. Publicity of these 
measures can follow if no effective action has been taken by the Member State. If 
the situation persists nevertheless, the Council gives notice to the Member State 
of the measures to be adopted in a certain time limit, and can oblige it to submit 
periodic reports about how political measures for economic adjustment are being 
implemented (the whole procedure is described in Article 126.3 to 9 TFEU). 
Up to this point the procedure is mainly of a political nature. On the one hand, 
this results from its exclusion from the scope of the infringement procedure before 
the CJEU (Article 126.10 TFEU); on the other, the Court itself has acknowledged 
that the Council has discretion not only to determine the existence of an excessive 
deficit, but also to make its own “assessment of the relevant economic data, of 
the measures to be taken and of the timetable to be met by the Member State 
concerned”.14 This means that there is no obligation on the part of the Council to 
follow Commission proposals or, in other words, politics still have a role to play at 
the Council. 
If the Council finally reaches the last stage in the procedure, the door is open 
for it to impose sanctions on the Member State concerned, namely requiring 
publication of additional information before issuing bonds, inviting the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) to reconsider lending policy towards the Member State, 
requiring the deposit of some sum until the excessive deficit has been corrected, 
or to impose fines (Article 126.11 TFEU). These measures are all of a binding 
nature so that their non-observance may result in the Commission launching an 
infringement procedure.
C) The relation between common monetary policy and 
coordination of national economic policies 
A final consideration must be made about how supranational monetary policy and 
national economic policies relate to each other. Both policies are intimately linked 
and it is not easy to separate them. Isolating monetary policy and conferring on the 
ECB the exclusive competence to define and implement it assures that Member 
States cannot directly interfere with the objective of price stability. However, some 
additional measures are required to guarantee that they do not put that objective 
at risk indirectly, in particular by not caring enough about the soundness of their 
public finances. To avoid this situation, in addition to the measures of a non-binding 
character we have reviewed, some other binding provisions in the Treaties prohibit 
credit facilities from the ESCB to any public institution (Article 123 TFEU), ban 
privileged access to financial institutions by public institutions (Article 124 TFEU) 
and rule out the transfer of liabilities from one Member State to other or to the 
14 Case C-27/04, Commission vs. Council, of 13 July 2004 [2004] ECR I-06649 (paragraph 80).
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European Union – what is known as the non-bailout clause (Article 125 TFEU).15 
The result of these provisions in combination is that Member States have to resort 
to markets when looking for financing. Since the cost of financing in the markets 
would be higher than when just printing money or borrowing on favourable conditions 
from the central bank, Member States, the argument goes on, will be aware of the 
importance of not going into the red. This would contribute to the soundness of 
their public finances. But, in addition, markets will impose different costs when 
lending money depending on the economic performance of each Member State. 
This means that for those with a budgetary deficit or public debt problems the cost 
of borrowing will be higher. Accordingly, markets will discipline profligate Member 
States if multilateral surveillance and the excessive deficit procedure do not.16 
III. A democratic legitimacy assessment of Economic 
and Monetary Union as established in Maastricht
When seen through the lens of our three theoretical models, EMU provisions as 
originally designed in the Maastricht Treaty correspond to two of these models. On 
the one hand, monetary policy was delegated to an independent institution, the 
ECB, in charge of conducting that policy according to its own technical knowledge. 
EMU was thus conceived as an alternative to democratic legitimacy. On the other 
hand, economic policies were to be decided by national parliaments, although 
different degrees of intervention from the European level were foreseen. This 
basically corresponds to the model complementing democratic legitimacy, although 
a more nuanced and detailed assessment is required.
The creation of an independent body with exclusive competences over monetary 
policy, as is the case with the ECB, corresponds to the model conceiving governance 
as an alternative to democratic legitimacy. Of significance in this matter are the 
conditions under which powers are transferred to the independent body. From a 
political science perspective (theory of principal and agent) the relevant question is 
how to strike the right balance between independence of the agent and control by 
the principal, from where legitimate power emanates. The more independent the 
15 When seen from the perspective of the ECB these provisions can be understood as guaranteeing 
its independence. See in this issue Tuori 2013. This seems to be an extended view: “Germany also 
eagerly designed the Maastricht regime so as to shield the central bank system from public debt in 
order to protect its glorified independence”, Bibow 2012, 31.
16 The Court of Justice recently arrived at the same conclusion when for the first time it had to 
interpret the provisions on EMU in a constitutional tone: “It is apparent from the preparatory work 
relating to the Treaty of Maastricht that the aim of Article 125 TFEU is to ensure that the Member 
States follow a sound budgetary policy (see Draft treaty amending the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community with a view to achieving economic and monetary union, Bulletin 
of the European Communities, Supplement 2/91, 24, 54). The prohibition laid down in Article 125 
TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter 
into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with such 
discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the 
financial stability of the monetary union”. See case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of 
Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, of 27 November 2012, not yet published (paragraph 135).
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agency, the more difficult it is to monitor its activities. In turn, the greater the control 
over the agency is, the less its room for manoeuvre and its independence from 
political power – the very reason for creating it. The concrete balance in each case 
is determined by the legal act by which delegation takes place. This is why from a 
legal point of view (theory of delegation) the issues involved are the exact content 
of delegated powers, the concrete purpose for which they are delegated and the 
legal conditions the body has to observe when carrying out its activity. 
In the particular case of the ECB the balance struck between Member States 
(principal) and the Bank (agent) leaves to the agent enormous room for manoeuvre 
over the highly sensitive issue of monetary policy without establishing any proper 
control by the principal. Member States and EU institutions have to fully observe 
Central Bank independence, the treaties explicitly guaranteeing it. This extremely 
loose delegation can only be understood when broadening the scope to see the 
full picture of the institutional architecture of EMU as designed in Maastricht. Once 
we take some distance it seems evident that, as mentioned, the institutional design 
of EMU and its ECB was very much inspired by the German economic setting 
and the Bundesbank: an independent central bank was in charge of monetary 
policy, guaranteeing price stability by keeping it away from the reach of politicians. 
Nonetheless, some differences between the two regimes have to be pointed out. In 
the German case central bank independence was a measure adopted for the better 
implementation of a democratically legitimated decision by which the legislative 
power considered price stability the main aim of Germany’s economic policy. It was 
considered that the best way to avoid time-inconsistencies in monetary policy was 
to assign its implementation to an independent body, but it was always possible for 
the German Parliament to overturn this political decision.17 
A similar setting seemed to be established in the European Union, but a closer 
examination of the conditions will lead us to different conclusions. In the first place, 
the independence of the ECB was assured under stricter conditions, since it resulted 
from the European treaties and not from a national law – which can be amended 
following easier procedures. Hence, the decision to assign monetary policy to 
an extremely independent body was of a systemic and constitutional nature.18 
Political power cannot regain monetary policy, as was possible under the German 
constitutional setting, unless an extremely unlikely agreement is reached between 
27 Member States to amend the treaties. The same can be said about determining 
17 It would be a different matter if it did exercise that power: “[N]o government has ever used its 
right to ‘veto’ a decision of the Central Bank Council. No government has ever seriously considered 
modifying the Bundesbank Act as a means to deal with cases of conflict, although it could have done 
so with a simple majority of the Parliament”, Tietmeyer 1991, 182–183. 
18 This decision had some inherent risks, as Herdegen already pointed out in the nineties: “It is not 
with great ease that constitutional doctrine approaches principles that place restraints on majority 
rule in the interest of economic wisdom. Economic wisdom is what economic science in a given 
moment suggests as economically sound. Freezing institutional rules and substantive principles on 
this basis implies an obvious risk which is inherent in all dictates of economic wisdom: subsequent 
falsification by new empirical messages or by scenarios which have not been anticipated”, Herdegen 
1998, 9.
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the main objectives of monetary policy. All this implies that monetary policy is 
autonomously conducted, and not merely implemented, by the fully-independent 
ECB following the constitutional mandate of price stability, in what constitutes an 
example of a governance mechanism alternative to democratic legitimacy. 
But there is another key difference between both regimes: the context of 
which they form part. While in Germany price stability was for historical reasons 
a matter of concern for all citizens and societal actors, and the independence of 
the Bundesbank was socially accepted and justified in order to achieve what was 
perceived as a social good for the entire society; while decisions and statements by 
the German Central Bank were perceived as arguments from authority and central 
bank independence was justified by the results of its successful monetary policy, in 
Europe the case was radically different. Member State acceptance of price stability 
resulted from the signature of a treaty, not from a social consensus about what was 
the most convenient policy for the Union. The consensus, if it existed, did not reach 
beyond political elites. The difference between the two regimes lies in the social 
embeddedness of central bank independence. When transferring the German 
institutional setting and political objectives to the supranational level, central bank 
independence was decontextualized. 
This is of the utmost importance, since legitimation of governance mechanisms 
constituting an alternative to democratic legitimacy depends on a highly delicate 
system of checks and balances. In the EU, strengthened (if not extreme) central bank 
independence is not balanced by social acceptance. This means that, in contrast to 
the case of the Bundesbank, which was implementing a democratically legitimated 
decision, the sole legitimating mechanism on which the fully independent ECB relies 
when conducting monetary policy is the results of its performance. Overlooking the 
fact that output legitimacy cannot be considered a proper legitimacy mechanism,19 
the serious consequence of this conception of monetary policy is that as soon as 
performance does not satisfy some societal actors, they will perceive the ECB as 
an illegitimate institution. 
Assessing the other side of EMU, economic policies were to be decided by 
national parliaments, but some input to their decision may result from broad economic 
policy guidelines and the multilateral surveillance procedure. European institutions 
and executives from other Member States, as participants in the Council, may 
thus have a say in national policies. Since their contributions are to lead towards a 
common agreed political objective, it can be considered that with their knowledge 
they are complementing the democratic legitimacy of national parliaments. Indeed, 
coordinating the action of the various democratically legitimated levels should be 
considered a governance mechanism complementing democratic legitimacy. 
A different situation applies regarding restrictions imposed by the rules limiting 
budgetary deficit and public debt – the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In this 
19 Since acceptance of the system depends on the results of government action, Max Weber 
considers effectiveness a reason for obedience. Nevertheless he rejects considering it a basis for 
legitimacy. See Weber 1978 [1922], particularly chapter III (212–301). 
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case the range of decisions that can be adopted by national parliaments according 
to democratic legitimacy is constrained by EU law. This limitation has been agreed 
by all Member States according to their constitutional provisions and should thus 
be considered legitimate, but including those restrictions of key legislative powers 
in treaties makes them fall well beyond the reach of national parliaments. And 
in democratic legitimacy terms it will be very difficult to justify such a measure if 
ever it goes against the will of parliament. Once again, subordinating democratic 
legitimacy to a concrete policy aim, and thus constraining the legislative power of 
national parliaments, can only be done with wide social agreement. Furthermore, 
this wide social agreement should not only exist at the foundational moment (in this 
case, when ratifying the Treaty of Maastricht), but it should also be continuously 
updated.20 Putting it in other words, social embeddedness is once again required. 
If one thinks about the difficulties of ratifying the Treaty of Maastricht21 and the 
everlasting European treaty amendments,22 with the peak example of the rejection 
of the Constitutional Treaty,23 it seems evident that wide social consensus across 
Europe on EMU does not exist. 
IV. New developments in economic 
governance since Maastricht
A first revision of the system designed in Maastricht took place when the SGP was 
amended in 2005. The revision took place after a controversy between Council 
and Commission over how to interpret the Pact had to be resolved by the Court 
of Justice.24 As a result, some elements of the Pact were amended, granting more 
discretion to the Council. A succinct description of these changes is thus required 
prior to addressing more recent developments mainly resulting from the economic 
crisis. Among the overwhelming number of recent novelties,25 this paper deals with 
20 “A further difficulty with the view that a central bank can receive all the legitimation that it may 
need from a delegation from the people is that, with the passage of time, the public that live under the 
decisions of any one bank may be very different from the public whose representatives authorised 
that independent central bank. Thus, in the case of most euro-zone countries, authorisation of the 
ECB dates back to treaties ratified by publics and parliaments twenty years ago”, Lord 2012, 42.
21 The Danes rejected it in a referendum held in 1992. After some amendments guaranteeing 
Denmark some opt-out rights (among them, importantly, from EMU) were included in the Treaty, 
the Danes voted for ratification in a second referendum. The referendum held in France resulted in 
acceptance of ratification by an extremely narrow margin: 51.05% of votes.
22 The Treaty of Nice was rejected by the Irish in 2001, but after a national debate it was widely 
accepted one year later in a second referendum. The Treaty of Lisbon was also rejected by the Irish 
in 2008 and finally accepted in 2009. 
23 The Constitutional Treaty was rejected in referenda by the people of two of the founding Member 
States. In France it was rejected by 54.87% of votes and in the Netherlands, where the referendum 
was of a non-binding nature, by 61.6%. 
24 See case C-27/04, Commission v. Council, supra fn. 14.
25 These have been studied in detail by Tuori 2012; Menéndez 2012a; Menéndez 2012b; and 
Ruffert 2011, 1777–1805.
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two strategies taking place in the coordination of economic policies, and not with 
those related to the monetary policy and the ECB26 or to the financial assistance 
mechanisms created to provide Member States with tools alternative to the market 
once it has proved inefficient in disciplining profligate Member States.27 In particular, 
the main developments aiming at giving an automatic and binding character to 
the previously political sanctions in multilateral surveillance and excessive deficit 
procedures will be explored: first a supranational strategy, focused on amending and 
supplementing EU secondary law developing Articles 121 and 126 TFEU (generally 
known as the Six-Pack), and then an intergovernmental strategy, consisting in 
drafting and ratifying a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (also known as the ‘fiscal compact’).28
A) The 2005 revision of the Stability and Growth Pact
EMU rules established in the Treaty of Maastricht were revised for the first time in 
March 2005. This revision was a direct consequence of the Council’s reluctance 
to adopt formal sanctions against Germany and France when they incurred an 
excessive deficit. The Commission recommended sanctions, but since this was 
a decision of a political and thus a discretionary nature, agreement in the Council 
was required, which Member States failed to achieve. Several reasons may explain 
this situation. On the one hand, incentives for Member States to employ sanctions 
were weak: not only do they usually try to avoid political conflicts, but they may 
also expect some reciprocal treatment in case of misbehaviour, especially since 
the amount for deposits and fines was impressive from the very first stage of the 
infringement procedure. On the other hand, it was not evident why pecuniary 
sanctions, worsening fiscal deficits, were the right way to solve the problem. But 
whatever the reasons were for the Council not imposing sanctions on Germany 
and France, this situation revealed a clear mismatch between the general design 
of EMU and Member State incentives to implement its rules, in particular those on 
imposition of sanctions.29 In what follows, we will describe first the content of the 
26 For a complete analysis of how the role of the ECB has substantially changed in recent years, 
see in this same issue Tuori 2013.
27 The key issue being if, and to what extent, these mechanisms observe the no-bailout clause 
(Article 125 TFEU). An excellent constitutional analysis in this respect in de Gregorio Merino 2012, 
1613–1645. 
28 According to the President of the European Council, sound national budgetary policies, the 
expected result of these two combined strategies, constitute a prerequisite for taking an ambitious 
next step in the development of EMU: providing the Union with fiscal capacity. See his report 
Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (5 December 2012), 8–12.
29 Lack of incentives for Member States under those conditions was already anticipated by 
Herdegen: “In any case, the impact of the sanctions regime can only lie in its deterrent effect. 
Any scenario confronting the Council with the actual imposition of sanctions would be evidence of 
failure”, Herdegen 1998, 31.
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subsequent amendments and then explain their significance for EMU’s institutional 
setting.
The revision was substantiated in two Council Regulations amending the 
two earlier Regulations developing the multilateral surveillance rules30 and the 
excessive deficit procedure.31 As to the former, the main innovation consisted in 
establishing a differentiated medium-term objective for each Member State which 
may diverge from the requirement of a ‘close to balance or in surplus’ position.32 
This aimed at taking into account “the diversity of economic and budgetary positions 
and developments as well as of fiscal risk to the sustainability of public finances, 
also in the face of prospective demographic changes”.33 The revised excessive 
deficit procedure, on the other hand, established a new definition of what a “severe 
economic downturn” was, by simply equating it to negative growth,34 instead of 
previous, more demanding requirements.35 This was relevant, since deficits 
resulting from an economic downturn should be considered exceptional and thus 
could then be more easily justified according to Article 126.2.a TFEU. Another 
novelty included in the excessive deficit procedure resulted from clearly setting out 
the elements the Commission should take into account when preparing a report 
on which to base an excessive deficit procedure against a Member State. Since 
Maastricht, the Treaties simply established that the report from the Commission 
should “take into account all other relevant factors” of the national economy having 
an impact on the final deficit (Article 126.3 TFEU), but after the amendment the list 
of issues is an exhaustive one, and even includes elements which “in the opinion of 
the Member State concerned” are relevant to justify the deficit.36 Finally, the revision 
also specified the deadline for the recommendation following the declaration by the 
Council of the existence of an excessive deficit, which according to the Treaties 
simply has to be “addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing 
that situation to an end within a given period” (Article 126.7 TFEU). A maximum 
30 Council Regulation (EC) 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on 
the strengthening of the surveillance budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, 1).
31 Council Regulation (EC) 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, 
5).
32 Article 2a of Regulation 1466/97 after amendment.
33 Recital 5 of Regulation 1055/2005.
34 The severe economic downturn can even be deemed exceptional if it results “from an 
accumulated loss of output during a protracted period of very low annual GDP volume growth 
relative to its potential” (Article 2.2 of Regulation 1467/97 after amendment).
35 Only an annual GDP fall of more than 2% was automatically considered a ‘severe’ downturn by 
the original SGP. In addition, the European Council could also decide to regard a fall of more than 
0.75% GDP as a severe downturn.
36 Article 2.3 of Regulation 1467/97 after amendment.
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deadline of one year was established, but the strict deadline was completed with a 
qualifying clause adding “unless there are special circumstances”.37 
Although there were also measures increasing the strictness of some elements 
of fiscal constraint, the overall result of the revision when taking into account 
the abovementioned changes was the weakening of budgetary discipline. This 
happened, in particular, because the new rules amended the substantive (economic) 
content of the previous regime and reduced the severity of its enforcing rules. 
For instance, by allowing the establishment of a different medium-term budgetary 
objective for each Member State depending on its particular economic context, 
the rule requiring a budget ‘close to balance or in surplus’ ceased to be clear and 
became subject to a discretionary assessment of the concrete circumstances of 
the Member State concerned.38 On the other hand, regarding the excessive deficit 
procedure, the main changes were all directed towards reducing its strictness. This 
resulted either from widening the scope of justifications for excessive deficits, from 
enumerating the complete set of issues the Commission is obliged to take into 
account when assessing the existence of an excessive deficit (and thus restricting 
its margin of discretion), or from allowing an extension of the deadline for correcting 
it if special circumstances occur.39 Therefore, coordination of national economic 
policies, required to establish and maintain a common currency area, was less 
strict after the revision. Furthermore, the rationale underlying the new regime is 
slightly different from the previous one: while the original SGP was based on a 
quick reaction once an excessive deficit was detected, after the amendment the 
idea was to give more time to Member States to address the problem. This explains 
the switch from a “rules-based system back to a system of discretionary fiscal 
policy making” (Calmfors 2005, 68). 
For Member States the amended SGP was the right way to “improve the 
credibility” of the coordination of national economic policies and to “increase their 
flexibility” to react to the economic context, thus resulting in an “enhanced legitimacy” 
of the whole EMU (Woods 2008, 129). We will proceed with the democratic 
legitimacy assessment of these measures below (Section V), but at this point it 
is important to stress that the key issue for this analysis lies in where the balance 
is to be struck between the political discretion needed to legitimately command 
economic policy, on the one hand, and the legal rules required for coordinating 
(and constraining) national economic policies in a single currency area, on the 
other hand. In the original version of the Pact, strict legal rules were established, 
37 Article 3.4 of Regulation 1467/97 after amendment.
38 A comment in Artis and Onorante 2008, 170-190.
39 When interpreted with the maximum laxity, the new pact could allow Member States to make the 
first deposit seven years after the excessive deficit took place, the formal fine (if it finally occurs) only 
taking place two years later. On these extended deadlines and the lack of strictness of the revised 
SGP, see Calmfors 2005, 63–66. 
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but they lacked an enforcing system automatically reacting to any breach;40 after 
the amendment, the SGP increases political discretion when deciding on breaches 
of substantive content, while sanctions still remain non automatic (see Table 1), 
hence a weakened budgetary discipline. 
It was in that context of relaxed budgetary discipline when the economic 
crisis emerged. Given its seriousness, with the whole EMU at stake, Member 
States followed two different but related strategies for improving the coordination 
of national economic policies. Both strategies have in common that they aim 
at reducing political discretion when implementing the rules of the Pact, even 
leading to a somewhat automatic enforcement of sanctions, but one does so in 
the EU law context (supranational strategy) and the other in the international one 
(intergovernmental strategy). 
B) The supranational strategy against the economic crisis: the Six-Pack
The supranational strategy has been substantiated in six different secondary law 
instruments, some concerning the multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 
121 TFEU),41 and some the excessive deficit procedure (Article 126 TFEU).42 
In broad terms, the main institutional change is the establishment of a European 
Semester, according to which national economic policies are closely coordinated, 
ensuring sustained convergence between Member States.43 But our assessment 
will only pay attention to some technical provisions of this complex set of pieces of 
secondary law, namely those which are of potential importance for our analysis. 
Starting with the excessive deficit procedure, the main novelty of the new regime 
is an emphasis on controlling not only excessive deficits, but also excessive public 
debt. To that end, a budgetary framework is established with common accounting 
systems for all Member States. This development constitutes a reaction to some 
40 “This system confers a political discretion on the Council the ambit of which remains rather 
unclear. Such discretion, albeit confined to exceptional circumstances (which justify bona fide efforts 
being honored), deprives the sanction regime of the automatism advocated by strict monetarists”, 
Herdegen 1998, 31.
41 Regulation (EU) 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 November 2011, 
amending Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, 12); 
Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 November 2011, on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, 25); Regulation 
(EU) 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 November 2011, on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area (OJ L 306, 23. 11. 2011, 
8); and Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 November 
2011, on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, 
1).
42 Council Regulation (EU) 1177/2011, of 8 November 2011, amending Regulation (EC) 1467/97 
on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 306, 
23.11.2011, 33), and Council Directive 2011/85/EU, of 8 November 2011, on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, 41).
43 Section 1-A of Regulation 1466/2011 after last amendment.
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events revealing weak points in the design of EMU, namely potential incentives 
for Member State authorities to tamper with national figures, as was the case with 
Greece, or the systemic consequences resulting from the mere risk of default by a 
Member State participating in the third stage of EMU, as proved by the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis which has devastated peripheral economies of the euro 
area. The aim of the amended system is, thus, to generally reinforce control over 
budgetary restraint. 
In this new version of the excessive deficit procedure, it still is for the Council 
to declare the existence of an excessive deficit, but its political discretion when 
doing so has been drastically diminished. According to the current drafting, the 
Council is, “as a rule, expected to follow the recommendations and proposals of the 
Commission or explain its position publicly”.44 This provision has been enshrined in 
a new Section of the Regulation entitled ‘Economic Dialogue’, but requiring public 
explanations only when the Council is to adopt a decision different to that proposed 
by the Commission does not seem to promote such dialogue adequately. Instead, 
it merely rewards the blind following of the Commission’s assessment. Although 
the Council still retains the power to decide about the existence of an excessive 
deficit, this new requirement leads to a decision-making procedure with a strong 
technocratic aftertaste. As a matter of fact, still under the heading of ‘Economic 
Dialogue’ the Commission is now given a key role monitoring national budgets. Its 
permanent dialogue with national authorities allows it to “carry out missions for the 
purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State”,45 
and even to “invite representatives of the ECB (…) to participate in surveillance 
missions”.46 Therefore, the new procedure promotes a substantial enhancement of 
the role of institutions with a technical instead of a political approach to economic 
policies.
Regarding the sanctioning dimension of the procedure it is worth mentioning 
that extended limits for correcting an excessive deficit are still stipulated,47 but time 
limits for adoption of sanctions are dramatically reduced to four months.48 As a 
way to increase the deterrent effect of the SGP, among the different measures 
provided for imposing sanctions in Article 126.11 TFEU “a fine shall, as a rule, be 
required”,49 its amount now comprising a fixed component of 0.2% of GDP and a 
variable component which together cannot exceed 0.5% of GDP.50 This means that 
44 Article 2a.1, second paragraph, of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment. The same is 
established in Article 2-ab.2 of Regulation 1466/97 after last amendment, dealing with the economic 
dialogue between European institutions in the context of the European Semester.
45 Article 10a.1 of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment.
46 Article 10a.3 of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment.
47 Article 2.6 of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment.
48 Article 6.2 of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment.
49 Article 11 of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment.
50 Article 12 of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment.
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the sanctioning procedure still depends on the discretion of the Council (Article 
126.11 TFEU), but apart from that decision all remaining elements of disciplinary 
measures (time limits, type of sanction and amount of fines) have been substantially 
hardened.
On the multilateral surveillance procedure side, even more developments have 
occurred. In addition to revision of Regulation 1466/97, three new Regulations 
have been passed. A thorough and detailed explanation of their content is beyond 
the scope and purpose of this paper. Instead, we will just refer to the features of 
these Regulations that are more relevant for our research, aiming at assessing the 
democratic legitimacy of recent governance mechanisms. 
These features are three. The first is the voting system arranged for assessing 
whether a Member State in the newly created excessive imbalance procedure51 
has observed a recommended action,52 as well as for deciding on formal 
sanctions against some Member State (be they interest-bearing deposits,53 non-
interest-bearing deposits54 or fines55) or for declaring, one month after there was 
no agreement in the Council (by qualified majority vote) at first attempt, that no 
effective action has been adopted by Member States regarding their stability or 
convergence programmes.56 For all these situations a similar drafting, altering the 
qualified majority voting rule established in the Treaties for the Council, has been 
employed, stating that decisions “shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless 
it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendations within 10 days of 
its adoption by the Commission”. Both drafting and procedure are reminiscent 
of the voting rules traditionally applied in some of the committees chaired by the 
Commission and in charge of the normative implementation of EU law (currently 
regulated by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU and the ‘Comitology’ Decision).57 In some 
of these committees, mainly dealing with issues of a highly technical content, 
representatives of the Member States can reject the Commission’s proposal under 
conditions similar to those required in that case. This ‘reverse qualified majority 
voting’ goes a step further in reducing discretion when implementing the SGP than 
the provision of the new excessive deficit procedure requiring the Council, as a 
rule, to observe Commission proposals. 
51 Chapter III of Regulation 1176/2011.
52 Article 10.4 of Regulation 1176/2011.
53 Article 4.2 of Regulation 1173/2011 and Article 3.3 in relation to 3.1 of Regulation 1174/2011.
54 Article 5.2 of Regulation 1173/2011.
55 Article 6.2 of Regulation 1173/2011 and Article 3.3 in relation to 3.2 of Regulation 1174/2011.
56 Article 6.2, fifth paragraph of regulation 1466/97 after last amendment, in what refers to stability 
programmes (for Member States participating in the third stage of EMU or, in other words, whose 
currency is the euro), and Article 10.2, fifth paragraph, of Regulation 1466/97 after last amendment, 
in what refers to convergence programmes (for Member States with a derogation).
57 Regulation (EU) 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 February 2011, 
laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States 
of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, 13).
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A second feature to be noted is the explicit administrative nature of some of 
the abovementioned sanctions, according to Article 9 of Regulation 1173/2011.58 
This is a radically new statement in EU law for several reasons. Firstly, because in 
the history of the EU legal order there has been no clear link between substantive 
content, material form and decision-making procedure for legal acts (Losada and 
Menéndez 2008, 347-351). In EU secondary law substantively legal as well as 
administrative issues were dealt with indistinctly by all legal acts at the disposal of 
the institutions,59 adopted following various procedures requiring different majorities. 
As a matter of fact, the Court of Justice had to establish some broad principles 
in order to guarantee, at least to a certain extent, a hierarchy between acts of 
secondary law.60 This situation has been recently clarified with the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, which distinguishes between legislative and non-legislative 
acts.61 However, this distinction is just a procedural one, since it simply results 
from the procedure according to which the act has been adopted and not from its 
substance or form. Secondly, it is dubious whether declaring the administrative or 
legal nature of sanctions is something that in EU law is for the decision-maker to 
determine. And finally, it is hard to accept that sanctions, which in this case may 
amount to 0.2% of GDP, can be considered of an administrative nature. 
A final feature worthy of comment is the investigative powers of the Commission in 
order to scrutinize Member State misrepresentations of deficit and debt data relevant 
for application of Articles 121 and 126 TFEU. The Commission “may conduct on-site 
inspections and accede to the accounts of all government entities at central, state, 
local and social security level”.62 These investigative powers also go a step further 
than the mere “mission” established for the excessive deficit procedure as well as 
for the new excessive imbalance procedure.63 In fact, these powers are equivalent 
to those the Commission has under competition law,64 although in the coordination 
of economic policies the existence of a clear legal basis for a development with 
58 Such explicit acknowledgement only refers to sanctions imposed under Regulation 1173/2011.
59 The difference between these acts depends on their legal effects, as established by article 288 
TFEU.
60 This hierarchy was based on the distinction between essential and non-essential elements of 
legal acts. See Case 25/70 Köster, 17 December 1970, ECR [1970] 01161 (paragraph 6).
61 Legislative acts are those adopted following the ordinary legislative procedure or a special 
legislative procedure (Article 289.3 TFEU), while non-legislative acts are delegated or implementing 
acts (Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, respectively).
62 Article 8.3 of Regulation 1173/2011.
63 Article 13.1 of Regulation 1176/2011. Article 13.2 also allows the Commission to undertake 
“enhanced surveillance missions (…) for the purposes of on-site monitoring” of Member States 
involved in an excessive imbalance procedure. 
64 In particular to those expressed in Article 105.1 TFEU and Article 20 of Council Regulation 
(EC) 1/2003, of 16 December 2002, on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, 1).
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such a potential impact on national sovereignty is not evident.65 In addition, it is 
well known that in the competition law field, the companies investigated, as legal 
persons, have been recognized holders of fundamental rights as a measure to face 
the extraordinarily invasive investigative powers of the Commission.66 It cannot be 
ruled out that, faced with a similar situation, the Court of Justice is inclined to grant 
some rights of defence to Member States under Commission scrutiny, but that 
could lead us to the paradoxical case of States entitled to rights at least similar to 
fundamental rights. 
In sum, the supranational strategy against the economic crisis drastically 
reinforces the constraints imposed on national economic policies by strengthening 
the excessive deficit procedure, now also closely monitoring public debt, and by 
exhaustively regulating the multilateral surveillance procedure. The latter is now 
headed by a European Semester strengthening coordination of Member State 
budgetary policies, and articulated by an excessive imbalance procedure strictly 
monitoring their implementation under the shadow of severe sanctions. 
C) The intergovernmental strategy against the economic crisis:  
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union
A second, intergovernmental strategy was launched in March 2012, when all 
Member States but the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic signed a Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG). The main aim of the Treaty is to “strengthen the economic pillar” of EMU 
by fostering budgetary discipline, reinforcing the coordination of national economic 
policies and improving governance of the euro area (Article 1.1 TSCG). It entered 
into force on the 1st January 2013, and at the time of writing it binds 17 Member 
States. Although this instrument is an international treaty, it has “to be applied 
and interpreted in conformity” with the EU Treaties (Article 2.1 TSCG) and, as a 
matter of fact, “[w]ithin five years (…) the necessary steps shall be taken (…) with 
the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of 
the European Union” (Article 16 TSCG). Notwithstanding these provisions, many 
doubts exist about the exact relationship between EU law and the TSCG. 
This paper will just deal with those aspects of the Treaty which are relevant 
for assessing the democratic legitimacy of its content. In particular, three of its 
65 The legal basis of Regulation 1173/2011 is Article 136 TFEU (“In order to ensure the proper 
functioning of economic and monetary union […] the Council shall […] adopt measures specific to 
those Member States whose currency is the euro: (a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance 
of their budgetary discipline; (b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, while ensuring that 
they are compatible with those adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under surveillance”) 
in combination with Article 121.6 TFEU (“The European Parliament and the Council […] may adopt 
detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure”).
66 Case C-94/00, Roquete Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, of 22 October 2002, 
[2002] ECR I-09011. For a general discussion, see Bombois 2012. 
Dictatorship of Failure
50
provisions are scrutinized. The first refers to the introduction of the balanced 
budget principle, as defined and expressed in Article 3.1 TSCG, in the signatories’ 
legal order “through provisions of binding force and permanent character, 
preferably constitutional” (Article 3.2 TSCG). Equally important, this provision 
also establishes that contracting parties “shall put in place at national level” some 
correction mechanism prepared to automatically trigger as soon as deviations 
from the SGP objectives take place. Furthermore, when doing so, signatories must 
observe the principles proposed by the Commission, even regarding “the role 
and independence of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring 
compliance” with SGP rules. Interestingly, “[s]uch correction mechanism shall fully 
respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments” (Article 3.2 TSCG). 
When read together, the contents of this provision result in the replication at 
national level of some commitments Member States have already accepted via EU 
law, as well as in the establishment of an additional and independent institutional 
apparatus in charge of monitoring their observance. The reason for this replication 
is to turn those commitments into national legal rules, thus internally binding and 
subject to judicial review from the national judiciary. The aim is, in sum, to make the 
contents of the SGP an internal legal obligation in addition to a political compromise 
at European level. Whereas strict observance of the Pact can be improved by 
diminishing discretion in the Council whenever it has to adopt a decision from which 
a subsequent sanction may result, as amendments in the supranational strategy 
prove, creating an internal obligation at state level complemented by an automatic 
reaction mechanism monitored by an independent institution will guarantee almost 
full compliance. 
Several questions arise in relation to this provision. First of all, despite the 
content of its Article 2.1, the TSCG cannot be consistently applied and interpreted 
in conformity with EU Treaties, because they are founded on a different premise. 
While the TSCG aims at replicating in the national legal order (preferably in 
constitutional norms) some of the contents of the SGP, even establishing a specific 
set of institutions in charge of monitoring their observance, EU law is based on a 
completely different rationale, according to which it is for Member States to decide 
how they implement supranational law. As long as they assure the effectiveness 
of EU law through their own institutions and procedures, they have discretion 
regarding the latter’s particular features. The TSCG operates exactly the other 
way around: since it requires Member States to replicate the SGP basic rules, 
preferably by constitutional norms and monitored by an institution which at least 
has to be independent (though not specified, presumably this means independent 
of both Government and Parliament), the TSCG is thus not observing the EU 
principle of institutional and procedural autonomy. This is difficult to reconcile with 
the idea of state sovereignty, unless we accept that the TSCG implies an extremely 
serious loss of power by Member States, a power which, importantly, has not 
been conferred on any other level of government. It is difficult to overemphasize 
the importance of Member States’ unilateral renunciation of these competences. 
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Requiring this renunciation to fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments 
seems, at least, contradictory, since the aim of the self-restriction is precisely to 
reduce those prerogatives. 
A similar contradictory situation takes place regarding a second provision, Article 
7 TSCG, which establishes that “[w]hile fully respecting the procedural requirements” 
of the European Treaties, the contracting parties “commit to supporting the 
proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission” regarding 
the declaration of excessive deficit. If the Treaties gave the Council discretion when 
adopting some EMU decisions, it seems that an international agreement between 
the Member States, aiming at ignoring such discretion and transferring de facto to 
the Commission the power to decide about the existence of an excessive deficit, 
will be difficult to reconcile with the observance of the procedural requirements 
of the European Treaties. Interestingly, this obligation to follow the opinion of the 
Commission ceases to exist as soon as a qualified majority of Member States 
rejects the proposal. This means that, resulting from this agreement between the 
contracting parties, a reverse qualified majority, in the same terms as analyzed 
in the previous section, is the required voting procedure. With this measure, 
contracting parties want to make the sanctioning procedure of a binding, legal 
character instead of a political one as was originally designed. To put it differently, 
this is a political agreement for changing de facto the decision-making procedure in 
force. But it is worth stressing, once again, that establishing a new voting rule not 
amending, but circumventing the literal tenor of the treaties distorts their content 
in such a way that it may be considered as against the general principle of sincere 
cooperation (Article 4.3 TEU).
Finally, a third provision of the new TSCG worth discussing is Article 8. Its first 
paragraph establishes that the Commission has to present a report assessing how 
contracting parties have implemented the changes required by Article 3.2 TSCG. 
Regardless of the Commission assessment, any contracting party concluding that 
another party has failed to comply with an obligation may bring the case to the 
Court of Justice. The second paragraph establishes that if the ruling of the Court 
is not observed by the contracting party affected, the issue can be brought back to 
the Court requesting imposition of financial sanctions, which can amount to 0.1% 
of GDP of the affected party.
The content of Article 8 TSCG is reminiscent of some procedures guaranteeing 
the observance of EU law by Member States, in particular of Articles 259 TFEU 
(infringement actions by one Member State against another Member State) and 
260 TFEU (financial sanctions in case of not complying with judicial decisions 
of the Court). However, there is a crucial difference between those proceedings 
and what is proposed in Article 8 TSCG: the yardstick against which legality is to 
be reviewed. While the role of the Court in the former is to determine if Member 
States have breached EU law, in the latter the control is of observance of the 
TSCG. Importantly, it is not clear if the Court will simply check that the institutions 
and procedures required in Article 3.2 TSCG have been actually incorporated into 
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national legal orders or if it will monitor how properly they work. The importance 
of this distinction between formal and substantive control should not be ignored. 
A Member State might have introduced in its legal order the principle of balanced 
budget and the institutions and proceedings for adequate monitoring and, if required, 
correction, but delays in the work of the judiciary, for instance, may diminish or 
even avoid their effectiveness (Ferreres Comella 2012). This could be considered a 
breach of the TSCG only if a substantive review of the obligations of the contracting 
parties is carried out. 
Another tricky question refers to control by the Court of Justice of the contracting 
parties’ observance of the last sentence of Article 3.2 TSCG, establishing that the 
“correction mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments”. 
A literal reading of Article 8 TSCG suggests that the Court is competent to proceed 
to such a review, since it mentions Article 3.2 TSCG without excluding any of its 
contents. This will lead to the paradoxical situation in which the prerogatives of 
national Parliaments are the object of a report by the Commission, lead to an 
infringement procedure before the Court after a complaint by some contracting party 
or even result in a sanction on the State for not observing them. This interference 
by other States, the Commission or the Court of Justice in constitutional issues 
of Member States is completely new in the European legal context and reveals 
that a radical shift has taken place in the model of integration – with even more 
extreme consequences if this provision is finally incorporated into EU law following 
Article 16 TSCG. Of course, the Court of Justice can decide that its assessment 
of respect for the prerogatives of national Parliaments can depend on the analysis 
and opinion of national (constitutional) courts, thus deactivating the potential 
legal conflicts arising. But that option will at the end of the day allow Member 
States to decide by themselves about their own observance of an international 
commitment, which plays down any effective control. Previous experience in 
European integration inclines us to think that a common definition of the concept 
of ‘prerogatives of national Parliaments’ will be established by the Court, that being 
the yardstick against which national legal orders must be compared. This means 
that the constitutional structure of Member States will be reviewed not according to 
their own constitutional provisions, but to those of the TSCG. 
V. A democratic legitimacy assessment of new 
developments in economic governance
Once the new governance mechanisms recently put into practice in EMU have 
been described, we will proceed to assess their democratic legitimacy using 
our threefold scheme. Substantial changes have occurred in the coordination of 
(national) economic policies, but when assessing them according to our three 
models some difficulties arise resulting from the two different dimensions that 
coordination entails. By the first dimension, the active side of coordination, we 
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refer to the set of political decisions and commitments Member States can adopt, 
according to EU Treaties, in order to make their economies converge, while the 
second dimension, the passive side of coordination, comprises all restrictions and 
constraints imposed on national economies.67 Our difficulties result from these 
limitations on national economic policies not easily fitting in any of our three models 
conceptualizing the relationship between governance and democratic legitimacy, 
since they do not establish a decision-making procedure but just constrain the range 
of policy options. Thus, an additional and more detailed analysis will be required, 
paying special attention to how much discretion is allowed when interpreting and 
enforcing those rules. 
Beginning with the assessment of the active side of the coordination of 
(national) economic policies, a first intuition is that the conditions under which it 
happens have been constrained since Maastricht. In the original agreement, 
national parliaments were to decide economic policies, but a say was given to 
European institutions and representatives of other Member States in the Council. 
We considered this a mechanism complementing democratic legitimacy, since 
through this multilateral surveillance procedure national parliaments were advised 
by experts from European institutions and from other Member States. Certainly, 
peer pressure could be exerted at the Council on a Minister of Economy when 
decisions with a potentially damaging effect for other Member States were adopted 
by its parliament, but this should be understood as giving voice to all those affected 
by the decisions of a single Member State in achieving some commonly agreed 
political objectives. The situation, however, is now radically different.
During the European Semester, which corresponds to the first half of the year, 
all activities related to coordination of economic policies at the supranational level 
are gathered. These comprise the formulation, surveillance and implementation of 
broad economic policy guidelines as well as of employment guidelines (Article 148.2 
TFEU), and also the submission and assessment of all stability and convergence 
programmes and national reform programmes.68 National budgetary procedures 
need now to be planned ahead and included in a scoreboard,69 so budgetary 
estimates can be revised at this point at the supranational level and, if needed, 
be the object of an in-depth review by the Commission.70 The new excessive 
67 The distinction between the active and the passive dimensions of coordination of national 
economies resembles the distinction between positive and negative integration made by F. W. 
Scharpf in several of his writings. However, our distinction differs from Scharpf’s in several aspects 
although, as a matter of fact, they often overlap. Firstly, because sanctions in EMU (passive 
dimension of coordination) require a positive decision by the Council (positive integration); but 
secondly, and even more important, because Scharpf’s distinction is not applicable to EMU, where 
measures are not aiming at “eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of competition” 
(negative integration) nor are they shaping “the conditions under which markets operate” (positive 
integration). Instead of microeconomics, where this distinction is pertinent and relevant, EMU deals 
with macroeconomics. See Scharpf 1996, 15–16. 
68 Article 2-a of Regulation 1466/97 after last amendment.
69 Article 4 of Regulation 1176/2011.
70 Article 5 of Regulation 1176/2011.
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imbalance procedure will ensure observance by Member States of budgetary 
stability through a permanent dialogue between the Commission and national 
authorities and, if needed, via enhanced surveillance missions for the purposes 
of on-site monitoring,71 thus curtailing national parliaments’ budgetary discretion. 
This new coordinated budgetary procedure, although still aiming at achieving 
a common political objective for all Member States, does not fit so well in the 
model of governance mechanisms complementing democratic legitimacy. The line 
distinguishing between what national parliaments are receiving, technical inputs 
from experts or instructions from non-representative institutions, has become 
thinner and, therefore, our analysis places these new rules closer to the model 
of governance mechanisms alternative to democratic legitimacy. Although an 
economic dialogue is established with the European Parliament, it should be 
noted that its content is merely informative and for the sake of transparency.72 
This means that no alternative mechanism of checks and balances legitimates 
this new decision-making procedure, even though it deals with one of the core 
areas of national sovereignty: deciding how the money collected through taxes will 
be spent. The result is that the legitimacy of the European Union and its Member 
States are both jeopardized. 
If constraints have been established regarding the active dimension of 
coordination of national economic policies, now to a great extent uploaded to 
the supranational level via the European Semester, on the passive side they 
have been strengthened to the point of making sanctions semi-automatic. This 
is a direct consequence of the new ‘reverse qualified majority vote’ required for 
the imposition of sanctions. The decision declaring the existence of an excessive 
deficit is still a matter to be assessed by the Council (Article 126.6 TFEU), although 
its discretion is now limited by constraints stemming, on the one hand, from 
the supranational level, since the observance, “as a rule”, of the position of the 
Commission is required in the context of the ‘economic dialogue’;73 and on the 
other hand, from the international level, where Member States have committed to 
supporting Commission recommendations and proposals (Article 7 TSCG). But 
these are neither the sole nor the most important constraints imposed on Council 
discretion, since once the existence of an excessive deficit has been declared, 
sanctions attached to it are to be adopted according to the new ‘reverse qualified 
majority vote’. Discretion in the Council has been reduced to a minimum. As a 
matter of fact, a detailed analysis of this procedure reveals that, according to the 
voting rules about qualified majority in the Council currently in force, Germany, the 
71 Article 13 of Regulation 1176/2011.
72 Article 14 of Regulation 1176/2011. See also Articles 3 of Regulation 1173/2011, 6 of Regulation 
1174/2011, 2-ab of Regulation 1466/97 after last amendment and 2a of Regulation 1467/97 after last 
amendment.
73 Article 2a.1, second paragraph, of Regulation 1467/97 after last amendment, and Article 2-ab.2 
of Regulation 1466/97 after last amendment.
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Netherlands, Finland and Austria would compose a “qualified minority” enough to 
adopt any proposal coming from the Commission.74 
As mentioned above, the design of this reverse qualified majority is reminiscent 
of some of the ‘Comitology’ procedures. Indeed, when read together with the 
provision declaring the administrative nature of these sanctions,75 it seems 
that European institutions have tried to consider these mechanisms as merely 
adopting normative implementing rules, thus corresponding to what according to 
our scheme would be the efficient implementation of democratically legitimated 
decisions. But when the scope of the analysis is broadened, several reasons lead 
us to think that it actually represents an instance of a governance mechanism 
alternative to democratic legitimacy. First, in formal terms, because this voting 
rule de facto alters the content of the Treaties, and therefore ignores the basic 
terms of the agreement between Member States as ratified by their parliaments. 
Secondly, as to the substance, because the sanctions imposed are not decisions 
of a technical nature, but of an extremely sensitive political content. And thirdly, 
combining form and substance, because the democratically legitimated decisions 
which it is allegedly implementing result from the new ‘European Semester’ which, 
as detailed above, constrains Council discretion and gives a prominent role to non-
majoritarian institutions, mainly the Commission but also the European Central 
Bank, in the design and coordination of economic policies. 
This substantial enhancement of the functions of non-representative institutions 
when designing economic policies leads us back again to the issue of what 
legitimating mechanisms alternative to democratic ones have been established. 
The Commission is an independent institution acting as agent of the Member 
States, but only accountable, to a certain extent, to the European Parliament. 
This institutional arrangement results from its assignments according to the 
original treaties, namely aiming at monitoring compliance with EU law by Member 
States and at implementing competition policy. These tasks were all related to 
microeconomics and, thus, did not have an impact other than tangentially on 
political decisions of macroeconomic weight. Hence institutional independence 
was justified and no additional mechanisms were required for legitimating its 
decisions. The situation changed, nevertheless, when new tasks were attributed 
to the Commission, first under the Maastricht Treaty and now, indirectly, resulting 
from the provisions of the Six Pack and the TSCG. In the original EMU these tasks 
just consisted in monitoring, advising and guiding Member States in coordinating 
their national economic policies, all decisions being adopted by the Council. The 
role of the Commission could be justified in terms of complementing the democratic 
legitimacy of those decisions with its technical advice. But, resulting from the 
contents of recent reforms, the Commission now is not only actively participating, 
74 A similar analysis, including Slovakia instead of Austria, was carried out by Menéndez 2012b, 
66. Notice, nevertheless, that it is only possible to attain the majority required with just four Member 
States if it is Austria who votes in favour.
75 Article 9 of Regulation 1173/2011.
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in the context of the European Semester, in coordinating the whole set of Member 
States’ macroeconomic policies, but it can even impose sanctions (needing the 
support of a minority in the Council) if the changes in national policies it suggests 
are not observed. 
After all this analysis, we can summarize the evolution of EMU rules since 
Maastricht, in particular concerning the passive side of coordination of national 
economic policies required to guarantee the stability of the single currency, by 
distinguishing three different stages, depending on how much discretion is allowed 
when interpreting the substantive content of the SGP, on the one hand, and in 
the adoption of sanctions, on the other. In the first stage, SGP rules were strictly 
interpreted but sanctions required a political agreement. In a second stage, after 
revision of the SGP, some more leeway in the interpretation of rules was allowed, 
sanctions still being political. Finally, after recent developments in EMU, strict legal 
rules are to be implemented under the shadow of semi-automatic sanctions (see 
Table 1).
TABLE 1 – Discretion allowed in the coordination of national economic policies in EMU
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The current design of EMU is an example of institutional experimentalism, 
where new powers and competences have been de facto conferred on an 
independent and pre-existing institution, aimed at radically different objectives 
and, thus, legitimated under a different rationale, without careful analysis of the 
consequences of those changes for the legitimating mechanisms of the European 
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Union as a whole. The result is that the sole mechanism able to legitimize EMU 
action nowadays is based on providing citizens with efficient results. Given the 
precarious and uncertain economic situation of many European citizens today and 
the social disembeddedness of the integration project, this seems far from being 
the general perception.
VI. Conclusions
Our democratic legitimacy assessment of EMU has revealed several trends in the 
European integration process which, when approached from a systematic point of 
view, identify some acute deficiencies of the European Union, raising certain and 
even urgent democratic concerns. The recent reform of the rules implementing 
the provisions of the Treaty on EMU (the supranational strategy) as well as the 
incorporation into national law of some of those arrangements via an international 
treaty (the intergovernmental strategy) respond to what was perceived as a collapse 
in the prevention of systemic risks for EMU. After the so-called failure of that 
‘preventive arm’, more radical measures have recently been adopted in order to 
ensure compliance with the SGP under the shadow of extremely severe sanctions 
(the ‘corrective arm’). It is in this new field where enormous power has been de 
facto transferred from democratically legitimated to independent non-majoritarian 
institutions (the Commission and the European Central Bank). This transfer of 
power sacrifices democratic legitimacy on the altar of a more efficient EMU, and 
parallels in the economic domain what has been happening during recent decades 
in other fields, where security has prevailed over freedom or uncertainty. Executive 
dominance seems to be the only reply to systemic crises. 
But we ourselves should question why all these corrective mechanisms did 
not exist before the crises. Was EMU badly designed just having a ‘preventive 
arm’ and relying on political sanctions to guarantee Member State observance? 
The truth is that a corrective arm did not exist simply because, according to the 
system designed in Maastricht, it would never be used: Member States should rely 
on markets for their financing, and even default if required. The need for all these 
measures is a direct consequence of the political decision not allowing default by a 
Member State (after the combined effect of that state disregarding its commitment 
to other Member States by tampering with its figures, and the markets not working 
as a disciplinarian mechanism), as should have happened if the original provisions 
of EMU were followed. 
The consequences of de facto abrogating these clear rules are nowadays 
evident: a redesign of the constitutional rules of EMU had to be improvised through 
supranational and intergovernmental strategies, thus paying more attention to the 
specific details of the huge economic problems to be solved than to the potential 
democratic risks to be avoided. In sum, the efficiency of concrete policies prevailed 
over abstract constitutional thinking. This is not without risks and, as a matter 
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of fact, this unbalanced approach finally resulted in a model which we can label 
‘exacerbated governance’.
This model jeopardizes the whole European integration project in several ways. 
First, by putting at risk the mechanism through which it has been traditionally 
carried out: law. Since EMU provisions will not only be internalized by national 
legal orders via the principle of primacy, but now they also have to be included in 
“provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional”, 
the door is open for national courts to interpret those provisions, thus undermining 
uniform interpretation of EU law by the Court of Justice. Secondly, by challenging 
national democracies, on which the European Union is based, by imposing 
economic policies not only against the will of their citizens but even without giving 
them a say. Thirdly, by corrupting the institutional setting of the Union, since non-
majoritarian institutions are now de facto dealing with issues which correspond to 
representative institutions. This also entails a connected problem resulting from 
the different and contradictory requirements for each role these institutions have to 
play. In the case of the Commission, independence is required for it to guarantee 
enforcement of EU law and, importantly, competition rules, but at the same time 
the pressure to make it a representative institution will increase once its role as de 
facto decision-making power in EMU is recognized.76 
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